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Abstract
A number of theoretical models predict that the slope of the Phillips curve in-
creases with trade openness, but cross-country studies provide little evidence for such
a correlation. We highlight two reasons for this ￿nding. Firstly, the strength of the
relationship may depend on the extent of exchange rate adjustment, which is a poten-
tial determinant of output and in￿ ation dynamics in open economies, but previous
studies have not made a distinction between ￿xed and ￿ oating exchange rate regimes.
Secondly, existing estimates of the Phillips curve slope are based on data from the
1950s through the 1980s, and are therefore likely a⁄ected by price and wage controls,
in￿ ationary oil price hikes and the role played by ￿scal policy in driving output and
in￿ ation (the underlying theory requires that monetary shocks dominate). We cal-
culate new measures of the Phillips curve slope using data from 1981-98, a period
during which these factors were arguably less important. Regressions based on the
new measures indicate that the Phillips curve slope increases with trade openness
amongst countries maintaining ￿ exible and semi-￿ exible exchange rate regimes, but
is unrelated to openness amongst countries maintaining ￿xed exchange rate regimes.
Keywords: Openness, in￿ ation, Phillips curve, sacri￿ce ratio, exchange rate regime.
JEL Classification: E31, E32, F41.
11 Introduction
This paper investigates the hypothesis that the slope of the short-run Phillips curve (the amount
of in￿ ation associated with a unit increase in output) is positively related to trade openness.
Such a relationship is suggested by open economy models incorporating short-run price stickiness,
for example Romer (1993) and Guender and McCaw (2000), but ￿nds very little support in the
existing empirical literature, see Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988), Ball (1994) and Temple (2002).
We argue for two important extensions of previous research. The ￿rst is to allow the relationship
between openness and the Phillips curve slope to depend on the exchange rate regime and the
second is to focus on measures of the Phillips curve slope obtained using data for the 1980s and
1990s.
The motivation for the ￿rst extension derives from the underlying theory. Open economy
models of the Phillips curve often assume that unanticipated increases in the money supply
lead to depreciation of the nominal and real exchange rates. This pushes up the relative price
of imports, raising in￿ ation and restricting the increase in output associated with monetary
expansion. These e⁄ects will be stronger in more open economies and therefore the slope of
the Phillips curve will be an increasing function of openness. To the extent that the exchange
rate is in practice an important determinant of output and in￿ ation adjustment, any positive
correlation between openness and the Phillips curve slope is likely stronger amongst countries
that follow ￿ exible exchange rate policies.1 In order to allow for this possibility the regression
models that we estimate control for an interaction between openness and the exchange rate
regime, the latter being measured using the de facto classi￿cations reported by Reinhart and
Rogo⁄ (2004).
The second innovation relates to the measurement of the slope of the Phillips curve. Most
existing research uses the output-in￿ ation trade-o⁄s reported by Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988)
and the sacri￿ce ratios calculated by Ball (1994). The sample periods used to calculate these
indices vary slightly across countries, the earliest data being from the late 1940s and the latest
from the mid 1980s. In this paper we calculate new versions of these statistics for the period
1A relationship between openness and the Phillips curve slope is still possible when the exchange rate is ￿xed.
The point here is that it is likely to be less strong than if the exchange rate were ￿ exible.
21981 ￿98. There are several reasons for expecting a stronger correlation between openness and
the Phillips curve slope during the post-1980 period. Firstly, the underlying theory requires
that monetary policy is the main driver of short-run output and in￿ ation movements, but prior
to the 1980s ￿scal policy played an important role in cyclical ￿ uctuations and this may have
undermined the link between openness and the Phillips curve. Secondly, price controls were
more common before 1980 and these may have limited the impact of exchange rates on domestic
prices, again weakening the relationship between openness and the Phillips curve slope.
Our results show that if the Phillips curve slope is measured using data through the mid-
1980s the ￿ndings are very similar to those of Temple (2002), in that the slope of the Phillips
curve appears to be unrelated to trade openness, even amongst countries that followed the most
￿ exible exchange rate policies. The picture changes when the regressions are estimated using
post-1980 data. The slope of the Phillips curve then increases with openness and the relationship
is stronger the more ￿ exible the exchange rate. This is consistent with the ￿ndings of Hau (2002)
who shows that within a sample of developing and industrial countries the variance of the real
exchange rate over the period 1980 ￿ 98 is negatively related to openness (the explanation is
that faster price adjustment in open economies cancels out the e⁄ects of the nominal exchange
rate on the real exchange rate, such that real exchange rate volatility decreases).
The relationships that we document are robust to adding further controls and to omitting
outlying observations, although the statistical signi￿cance of the results varies across model
speci￿cations. The in￿ uence of the exchange rate regime appears more important when the
Phillips curve slope is measured using the output-in￿ ation trade-o⁄ than when it is measured
using the sacri￿ce ratio, possibly because the two indices measure the relationship between
output and in￿ ation over di⁄erent time horizons.
The rest of the paper expands on these points and is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews
the theoretical literature on openness and the Phillips curve. Section 3 describes the empirical
framework to be used and deals with important issues such as the measurement of the Phillips
curve slope, trade openness and the exchange rate regime. Sections 4 and 5 present results based
on the methods for measuring the Phillips curve slope suggested in Ball, Mankiw and Romer
(1988) and Ball (1994) respectively. Section 6 concludes with a summary of the main arguments.
32 Open economy models of the Phillips curve
The link between openness and the slope of the Phillips curve is analysed in Romer (1993), who
builds on an earlier contribution by Rogo⁄ (1985). In this model prices are sticky for a ￿xed
proportion of domestically produced goods, while the price of imported goods is equal to the
exogenous foreign price multiplied by the nominal exchange rate. If there is an unanticipated
increase in the money supply the real exchange rate will depreciate and this will a⁄ect the
Phillips curve for two reasons. Firstly, some imports contribute to the domestic price level
directly and as these goods increase in price following a depreciation the rate of in￿ ation will
rise.2 Secondly, if wages are indexed to the general price level, or if imported materials are
used in domestic production, ￿rms will increase output by less for a given increase in the money
supply because higher costs make production less pro￿table. In more open economies both e⁄ects
will be stronger, a point emphasised by Karras (1999), who shows empirically that in￿ ation is
more responsive to money supply shocks and output less responsive to money supply shocks
the greater is trade openness. If the slope of the Phillips curve is measured as the derivative of
in￿ ation with respect to output (relative to trend) it will be positively related to openness.
As noted by Temple (2002) the argument requires a systematic link between monetary shocks
and the real exchange rate. In Romer￿ s model it is assumed that domestic and foreign goods are
imperfect substitutes and that each country can in￿ uence the world price of goods through its
production decisions. A monetary expansion raises domestic output relative to foreign output
and consequently the relative price of domestic goods falls, i.e. there is a real depreciation.
Lane (1997) argues that the assumption that each country can a⁄ect world prices is unrealistic,
particularly if trade patterns are highly diversi￿ed. An alternative approach is the monetary
theory of the exchange rate used in the models of Dornbusch (1976), Frankel and Chinn (1995)
2This argument assumes that there is some pass-through from exchange rate ￿ uctuations to both import
prices and consumer prices. Empirical studies typically ￿nd partial pass-through to import prices and limited,
though still statistically signi￿cant, pass-through to ￿nal prices, see for example McCarthy (1999). It is important
to note that the argument presented here requires pass-through to consumer prices following monetary shocks.
Pass-through following exchange rate ￿ uctuations that are unrelated to monetary policy may still be incomplete,
and it could be these episodes that dominate the results from empirical studies that document very low rates of
pass-through to ￿nal prices.
4and Guender and McCaw (2000) amongst others. In such models the nominal exchange rate
(domestic currency units per foreign currency unit) equals the domestic money supply minus
domestic output, plus a random shock (all variables in logs). As some domestic prices are sticky
in the short-run, an unexpected increase in the money supply will depreciate the exchange rate
more quickly than it increases the average price level, such that the real exchange rate falls.
The empirical evidence suggests some support for a link between monetary policy and the
exchange rate. Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1996, pp. 621-22) note that the Volcker de￿ ation that
took place in the United States during the early 1980s and the Thatcher-Howe de￿ ation that
occurred in the United Kingdom at the same time were both associated with appreciations of
the nominal and real exchange rates. Faust and Rogers (2003) show that structural expansions
in monetary policy in the United States induce depreciation of the US dollar against the British
pound and the Deutsche Mark, though they also note that monetary policy is not the dominant
source of exchange rate volatility amongst these countries.
The exchange rate adjustment required for a correlation between openness and the slope of
the Phillips curve will occur less often in countries that ￿x the exchange rate. In the polar case
of a completely ￿xed exchange rate and full capital mobility domestic monetary policy must
always be set in line with foreign monetary policy, see Shambaugh (2004) for some supporting
evidence. If policy were not to be set in this way an interest rate di⁄erential would emerge
between the home economy and the rest of the world and the ￿xed exchange rate would be
untenable. In this setting movements along the short-run Phillips curve can still occur, e.g. due
to the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy or the world business cycle, but if the nominal exchange rate is ￿xed
these ￿ uctuations may be less highly correlated with increases in the relative price of imports
and consequently the link between the Phillips curve slope and openness will be less strong.
It is important to note, of course, that ￿xing the exchange rate a⁄ects just one of the channels
through which openness may in￿ uence the Phillips curve slope, and that a correlation between
these two variables could arise through other channels. If, for example, the short-run supply
curve for imports is more inelastic than that for domestically produced goods, e.g. because there
is a time lag in increasing the quantity of imports, then the positive relationship will still hold.
The point to be emphasised here is simply that we expect the relationship between openness and
5the slope of the Phillips curve to be less strong under ￿xed exchange rates than under ￿ exible
exchange rates.
A ￿nal point to note is that some recent theoretical contributions suggest that openness
decreases the slope of the Phillips curve. In Razin and Yuen (2002) increased openness is asso-
ciated with fewer borrowing constraints and greater consumption smoothing. This reduces the
incentive for workers to decrease real wage demands following negative monetary shocks, which
in turn reduces the incentive for ￿rms to cut prices. Consequently in￿ ation is less responsive
to output in more open economies, i.e. the Phillips curve is less steep. Daniels and VanHoose
(2003) reach a similar conclusion using a model based on imperfect competition in product and
labour markets. In this framework greater openness reduces the income elasticity of spending on
domestic goods and therefore weakens the incentive for ￿rms to raise prices following an output
expansion.
These models abstract from the import price e⁄ects emphasised in Romer (1993) and Guen-
der and McCaw (2000). Therefore in practice the relationship between openness and the slope
of the Phillips curve will depend on whether the e⁄ects of the exchange rate on consumer prices
and output dominate the microeconomic e⁄ects discussed in Razin and Yuen (2002) and Daniels
and VanHoose (2003). The results to be presented in this paper support the view that openness
increases the slope of the Phillips curve, especially under ￿ exible exchange rate conditions. This
does not rule out the mechanisms emphasised in more recent contributions, but does suggest
that during the post-1980 period their e⁄ects have been less strong than those operating through
the exchange rate.
3 Testing models of the Phillips curve
The empirical relationship between openness and the slope of the Phillips curve is brie￿ y exam-
ined in Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) and Ball (1994). Neither study ￿nds any evidence that
openness increases the slope of the Phillips curve. Temple (2002) reaches a similar conclusion
in a more detailed study that controls for other macroeconomic variables and for the e⁄ects of
outlying observations. The regressions estimated in these studies are of the form
6PCi = const + ￿ ￿ OPENi + ￿0X (1)
where i denotes a country, PC the slope of the Phillips curve, OPEN the share of imports
in GDP and X a set of additional controls. In order to allow the impact of openness on the
slope of the Phillips curve to be larger in countries that follow ￿ exible exchange rate policies
we de￿ne EX as an indicator of the exchange rate regime that increases with exchange rate
￿ exibility and has a zero mean across i. An extended regression model can then be written as
PCi = const + ￿OPENi + ￿OPENi ￿ EXi + ￿0X (2)
In equation (2) the ￿ parameter measures the e⁄ect of openness on the Phillips curve slope
amongst countries that maintain an ￿average￿amount of exchange rate ￿ exibility. The ￿ para-
meter captures the change in the impact of openness that occurs as the ￿ exibility of the exchange
rate increases. Equation (2) therefore allows for the possibility that the relationship between
openness and the Phillips curve slope is stronger amongst ￿ exible exchange rate countries. It
should be noted that the interaction term may a⁄ect the estimate of ￿. If OPEN and EX
are negatively correlated, e.g. because relatively open economies are more likely to maintain
￿xed exchange rates (Edwards (1996)), omitting the interaction term could bias the ￿ parameter
towards zero.
Measuring the Phillips curve slope Following Temple (2002) we look at two separate
measures of the slope of the Phillips curve, the output-in￿ ation trade-o⁄s of Ball, Mankiw and
Romer (1988), hereafter BMR, and the sacri￿ce ratios of Ball (1994).3 The ￿rst of these is
discussed here and the second is discussed in section 5. BMR measure the slope of the Phillips
curve by estimating the responsiveness of output to in￿ ation. This is given by the ￿ coe¢ cient
in the regression
yt = const + ￿￿xt + ￿yt￿1 + ￿t (3)
The log of real GDP in year t, yt, is regressed on a constant, its own lag, a time trend and
the change in the log of nominal GDP, ￿xt. The ￿ coe¢ cient indicates the proportion of a shock
3Temple also considers a third measure due to Jordan (1997), but in less detail than the other two measures.
7to nominal GDP that shows up in output within the same year. An estimate of ￿ close to unity
implies that real and nominal GDP are highly correlated and that price movements account for
very little short-run nominal income variation. This suggests that the Phillips curve is shallow
in output-in￿ ation space. In contrast, an estimate close to zero suggests that the Phillips curve
is steep, since in￿ ation rather than output is the main driver of nominal GDP. Hence, the ￿
parameter is negatively related to the slope of the Phillips curve.
BMR compute ￿ for 43 countries using time series running from the late 1940s to the mid
1980s, though varying by country. Additionally, the sample is split at the end of 1972 and
separate ￿ coe¢ cients are estimated for each sub-sample. A key contribution of this paper is
to consider not only these measures of the Phillips curve slope but also new estimates based on
the period 1981￿98.4 These use data from the International Financial Statistics database, the
source referenced by BMR.
There are several reasons for considering updated measures of the slope of the Phillips curve.
Firstly, the theoretical models discussed in section 2 predict a correlation between openness and
the slope of the Phillips curve on the assumption that macroeconomic ￿ uctuations are the result
of monetary shocks that induce exchange rate adjustment. During the ￿rst half of the post-war
period, however, governments often used ￿scal policy to manage demand (see Nelson (2003) for a
discussion of the British case) and such policy interventions need not induce the same exchange
rate adjustment as monetary shocks. In contrast, since 1980 ￿scal policy has played a less
important role in short-run ￿ uctuations. One reason for this is that ￿scal policy discretion has
been curbed by formal legal restrictions such as the balanced budget requirements introduced in
the United States and the stability and growth pact adopted by European countries preparing
for monetary union. Fatas and Mihov (2004) discuss the restrictions that have been imposed on
discretionary ￿scal policy since the 1980s.
Secondly, price controls were commonplace prior to 1980, for example they were implemented
in the United States by the Nixon administration and in the United Kingdom by the Heath
administration.5 Such restrictions may have limited the impact of the exchange rate on in￿ ation
4The sample ends in 1998 because after this year many European countries adopted a single currency, which
complicates the measurement of trade openness in the cross-country regressions.
5Nielsen and Bowdler (2005) show that price and wage adjustment in the United Kingdom was a⁄ected by the
8and thereby weakened the relationship between openness and the slope of the Phillips curve.
Since 1980 state regulation of price-setting has been less important, partly as a result of the
privatisation of many state controlled industries, and such a change makes a relationship between
openness and the Phillips curve slope more likely during the post-1980 period.
Thirdly, the 1970s saw two large surges in oil prices, which increased in￿ ation and decreased
output relative to trend. These may have distorted the measurement of the Phillips curve slope.
BMR acknowledge this point but argue that it does not a⁄ect their ￿ndings concerning average
in￿ ation and the slope of the Phillips curve. In principle the problem could be addressed through
estimating equations that control for supply-side in￿ uences on in￿ ation, see Bowdler (2003), but
the data required for such an exercise are not available for a large sample of countries. Instead,
measuring the Phillips curve slope using post-1980 data is a simple way of trying to reduce the
e⁄ects of measurement bias, since data commencing in 1981 are less likely to be a⁄ected by large
supply shocks. This provides a second reason for considering updated measures of the Phillips
curve slope.6
The new measures of the slope of the Phillips curve are calculated for 41 countries and are
tabulated in the appendix. The correlation between these measures and the full sample BMR
estimates is 51%, indicating that the pattern of international di⁄erences in the slope of the
Phillips curve has changed over time.7 The main di⁄erences between the two sets of estimates
often occur for countries for which the earlier measure is very close to zero. For example,
the largest discrepancies occur for the UK and Austria, and for each of these countries the
BMR statistic for the period 1948 ￿ 86 is ￿0:020 (the estimates that we obtain for the post-
1980 period are 1:039 and 0:753 respectively). One explanation for these di⁄erences is that
the earlier estimates re￿ ect the importance of supply shocks, which typically induce a negative
correlation between output and in￿ ation and therefore bias the ￿ coe¢ cient towards zero.8
price controls imposed during the 1970s.
6The post-1980 period includes the 1986 oil price collapse, but the macroeconomic e⁄ects of oil price reductions
are known to be smaller than those of oil price increases, see Muellbauer and Nunziata (2004).
7Data revisions could account for some of the di⁄erences. If we compute the BMR statistic using our data for
the period 1973￿86 the correlation with the series that BMR compute for 1973￿86 is over 90%, suggesting that
data revisions are unlikely to be the main reason for the di⁄erences between the BMR full sample statistics and
those that we obtain for 1981 ￿ 98.
8It is interesting to note that Froyen and Waud (1995) question the accuracy of BMR￿ s estimate of the slope
9This may explain why the average value of the earlier estimates, at 0:238, is less than that of
the later estimates, which is 0:312. It should be noted, however, that the post-1980 readings
do include some negative numbers, indicating that whilst these estimates may provide a more
accurate description of cross-country di⁄erences in the slope of the Phillips curve, an element of
measurement bias remains.
Measuring trade openness Trade openness is measured as the share of imported goods and
services in domestic GDP, an approach that is standard in the literature, see Romer (1993) and
Temple (2002). The ￿gure for each country is an average over the period of time for which the
slope of the Phillips curve is measured and is recorded as a decimal, i.e. 30% openness is 0:3.
Measures of the exchange rate regime The main exchange rate regime classi￿cation con-
sidered in this paper is that due to Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2004). This index is available at
the annual frequency and varies from 1 to 5, where higher values denote greater exchange rate
￿ exibility. The classi￿cation has two important characteristics. Firstly, it is a de facto clas-
si￿cation based on the volatility of the actual exchange rate. This is important because the
theoretical discussion in section 2 suggests that actual exchange rate ￿ exibility matters for the
determination of the Phillips curve slope, not the regime that policy authorities claim to be
maintaining (Romer (1993) argues that a de jure exchange rate regime classi￿cation may be of
little relevance in explaining the openness-in￿ ation relationship). Secondly, where relevant, the
classi￿cation uses parallel exchange rate data in addition to o¢ cial exchange rate data. The
former refers to the price at which currency is traded in transactions that do not involve the
central bank. Reinhart and Rogo⁄ note that the parallel rate is a good leading indicator for the
o¢ cial rate and best captures foreign exchange market conditions. As it is the average rate at
which currency is actually traded that determines import prices and the slope of the Phillips
curve, the Reinhart-Rogo⁄ index is a suitable exchange rate classi￿cation for the analysis to be
carried out in this paper.9
of the Phillips curve for Austria.
9The classi￿cation is based on a country￿ s exchange rate against a major trading partner rather than a trade
weighted exchange rate, which would be preferable. The problem should not be too important, however, because
the number of base countries is quite small, which means that when a country depreciates against its largest
10An observation for EXi in equation (2) is obtained by ￿rst taking the average of the Reinhart-
Rogo⁄index for country i over the period for which PCi is measured. This gives a cross-country
exchange rate regime classi￿cation that is converted to zero mean form through subtracting the
sample average from each observation. The demeaned variable is then used in the regression
analysis. It is important to note that using time averages of the Reinhart-Rogo⁄ index means
combining information from separate exchange rate regimes in some instances, and we address
the implications of this in section 4.10
The exchange rate regime classi￿cation due to Shambaugh (2004) is also considered in some
of the regression estimates in order to check the robustness of the basic results. This is a 0 ￿ 1
de facto classi￿cation that uses di⁄erent criteria in assessing actual exchange rate behaviour and
does not look at parallel market data. As such it is closer to the de jure classi￿cation reported
by the IMF (the correlation between the Shambaugh and IMF measures is 83% in our sample
of countries, whilst the correlation between the IMF and Reinhart-Rogo⁄ measures is 59%).11
4 Empirical results
In the ￿rst column of Table 1 the dependent variable is the BMR parameter measured for the
period 1948 ￿ 86. The controls (in addition to openness) are the level and square of average
annual in￿ ation and the level and square of the standard deviation of annual nominal GDP
growth, each calculated for the period used to estimate equation (3). BMR argue that these
variables a⁄ect the Phillips curve through their impact on the frequency of price adjustment.
Our data for openness do not go back to the 1940s, so as in Temple (2002) the openness statistics
trading partner it is also likely to be depreciating against other large trading partners.
10We also computed EXi for a version of the Reinhart-Rogo⁄ scheme de￿ned over the range 1 ￿ 4, where the
level 4 category is obtained through merging the level 4 and level 5 outcomes from the original classi￿cation. Level
4 in the original Reinhart-Rogo⁄ scheme refers to ￿ exible exchange rates, while level 5 refers to currencies that
are ￿ exibly priced and judged to be in crisis (￿ freely falling￿ ). The rationale for combining these two categories is
that an EX variable that assigns a relatively high score to freely falling currencies may be too sensitive to these
rare events. The qualitative implications of the results that we report in section 4 are robust to constructing EX
from an exchange rate classi￿cation de￿ned over the range 1 ￿ 4.
11A further classi￿cation is provided by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), but is only available for two
thirds of the countries that we consider.
11used in columns (1) and (2) are those from Romer (1993), which are averages for the period
1973 ￿ 88.12 The appendix lists the 41 countries included in the full sample and notes some
minor di⁄erences between this sample and that used by Temple (2002). Estimation is by OLS
and t-ratios are presented in parentheses.13 The latter are based on heteroscedasticity consistent
standard errors that allow for the possibility that the Phillips curve proxy is more accurate for
some countries than for others. The standard errors are not adjusted to take account of the
uncertainty associated with the derived dependent variable, but remain valid when calculating
t-ratios for the null of no e⁄ect, see Pagan (1984).14
The results con￿rm the main ￿ndings from past research: Openness does not exert a signif-
icant e⁄ect on the slope of the Phillips curve and the point estimate is of opposite sign to that
predicted by Romer (the coe¢ cient on OPEN should be negative if openness leads to steeper
Phillips curves). Column 2 adds the interaction OPEN ￿EX, but this term is also insigni￿cant.
In columns 3 and 4 all of the variables are measured over the period 1973 ￿ 86 (the dependent
variable is based on our calculations). The coe¢ cients for OPEN and OPEN ￿ EX are neg-
atively signed, but are insigni￿cant in most cases and adding further controls does not change
this picture (results not reported).
In columns 5 ￿ 10 the variables are measured using data for 1981 ￿ 98. A simple regression
in which OPEN is the only control produces results similar to those obtained previously. The
picture changes in column 6, however. Allowing the relationship between openness and the
slope of the Phillips curve to depend on the exchange rate regime leads to a negative coe¢ cient
on openness and this is signi￿cant at the 15% level, indicating some evidence that openness
is associated with steeper Phillips curves amongst countries that allow an intermediate degree
of exchange rate ￿ exibility. Amongst countries for which the exchange rate regime indicator is
one standard deviation above the mean, the e⁄ective coe¢ cient for openness is ￿1:10, which is
signi￿cant at the 1% level, whilst amongst countries for which the exchange rate regime indicator
12There is only partial overlap with the 1948￿86 period used to measure the dependent variable, but this will
be of little consequence given that between country variation in openness dominates within country variation in
openness.
13All of the regressions reported in this paper use the PcGIVE software of Doornik and Hendry (2001).
14All of the regressions reported in this paper were obtained using the PcGIVE software of Doornik and Hendry
(2001).
12is one standard deviation below the mean, the e⁄ective coe¢ cient is :10, which is insigni￿cant
at all conventional levels. Hence, the column 6 results indicate a strong correlation between
openness and the Phillips curve slope amongst ￿ exible exchange rate countries, a weaker and
less signi￿cant relationship amongst countries maintaining intermediate exchange rate ￿ exibility,
and no relationship between openness and the Phillips curve slope amongst countries maintaining
￿xed exchange rates.
It is interesting to focus on the changes in the results that occur across columns 5 and
6 on controlling for the interaction term. As OPEN and EX are negatively correlated in
the sample, a regression that does not include the interaction term indicates a weak correlation
between openness and the Phillips curve amongst countries that maintain intermediate exchange
rate ￿ exibility, in addition to leaving out the very strong relationship between openness and the
Phillips curve slope amongst ￿ exible exchange rate countries.
The remaining columns add further variables. Controlling for mean in￿ ation (column 7)
yields an openness coe¢ cient for the ￿ average￿country (in terms of exchange rate ￿ exibility)
that is signi￿cant at the 5% level, though including the square of mean in￿ ation in column
8 weakens the results. Adding the volatility terms leaves the results essentially unchanged,
but we do not attach great importance to these regressions given that the point estimate for
V OL is of opposite sign to that predicted by theory (Lucas (1973) argued that greater nominal
uncertainty should increase the slope of the Phillips curve, in which case the coe¢ cient for V OL
should be negative). One explanation for this ￿nding is that V OL is a poor measure of nominal
uncertainty.
What of the quantitative signi￿cance of the results? Using the column 7 estimates, the
increase in the slope of the Phillips curve associated with a one standard deviation increase
in openness is 0:62 standard deviations of the dependent variable if exchange rate ￿ exibility is
one standard deviation above the mean, 0:41 standard deviations of the dependent variable if
exchange rate ￿ exibility is at the mean, and 0:20 standard deviations of the dependent variable if
exchange rate ￿ exibility is one standard deviation below the mean. These e⁄ects are somewhat
smaller if calculated using the results from the other columns, but still suggest that openness
may account for an important component of international variation in the slope of the Phillips
13curve, especially if the exchange rate is free to ￿ oat.
Table 1 - see end of document.
4.1 Sensitivity and robustness
Yuen (2001) argues that the exchange rate regime a⁄ects the slope of the Phillips curve directly.
If this is the case the e⁄ect of OPEN ￿ EX could be spurious in the sense that it depends on
excluding the level of EX from the regressions. Adding EX to speci￿cations 6 ￿ 10 in Table
1 leads to very small increases in the absolute t-ratios for OPEN and very small decreases in
those for OPEN ￿EX, while the EX term itself is not robustly signi￿cant (results are available
on request). Thus, the ￿ndings do not depend on excluding the level of EX from the regressions.
Checking for outlying observations The second issue that we address is whether or not
the results are dependent on outliers. In order to do this we regress PC on OPEN ￿ EX and
collect the residuals, PC1￿. Then we regress OPEN on OPEN ￿EX and collect the residuals,
OPEN1￿, and then we plot PC1￿ against OPEN1￿ in the top left graph in Figure 1. This is the
projection of the regression plane from column 6 in Table 1 into OPEN ￿PC space. The graph
in the top right box in Figure 1 is the projection of the same regression into OPEN ￿EX ￿PC
space. The second and third rows contain analogous plots for regressions 8 and 10 from Table 1
(only the projections into OPEN ￿PC and OPEN ￿EX ￿PC space are reported). If outliers
drive the results, these observations will be easy to detect in scatter plots for the transformed
variables.
In each of the plots the data points occur at regular intervals and the lines of best ￿t do not
appear to be dependent on speci￿c observations. One possible exception occurs in respect of
the observation lying furthest east in each of the six panels, which is that for Israel. Regressions
estimated for a sample that excludes Israel are reported in the ￿rst two rows of Table 2. The
relationship between openness, the exchange rate regime and the slope of the Phillips curve is
generally robust, and is actually somewhat stronger in the case of the regression that controls
for in￿ ation and its square.
14In the third and fourth rows of Table 2 the regressions are estimated using samples that
exclude Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil. Although these countries do not appear as conditional
outliers in Figure 1, their average in￿ ation rates far exceed the sample average and could be
exerting undue in￿ uence. The results are weaker in the more general of the two models, mainly
because the exclusion of these countries leads to an increase in the signi￿cance of the in￿ ation
regressors, which then reduces the partial correlation between the Phillips curve slope and terms
in openness.
Identifying individual exchange rate regimes The next question that we address is
whether or not the results are a⁄ected by the fact that the 1981 ￿ 98 period often sees changes
in the Reinhart-Rogo⁄ index, e.g. a country could be classi￿ed as 1 (completely ￿xed exchange
rate) for 1981 ￿ 89 and 2 (limited exchange rate ￿ exibility) for 1990 ￿ 98. Such changes could
lead to time variation in the Phillips curve slope. In order to address this issue we identify for
each country the longest interval from the post-1980 period for which just one of the 5 categories
in the Reinhart-Rogo⁄ scheme is applicable. The slope of the Phillips curve and each of the
regressors are calculated for the period for which an unchanged exchange rate regime applies
and the cross-country regressions re-estimated using the new data. The results are summarised
in the ￿fth and sixth rows of Table 2. The coe¢ cients on OPEN and OPEN ￿ EX are sig-
ni￿cant at the 5% level in each speci￿cation and therefore provide somewhat stronger evidence
for a link between openness and the Phillips curve than did the baseline results. The point esti-
mates and standard errors for the openness terms are larger than in Table 1, possibly re￿ ecting
greater estimation uncertainty when shorter periods are used to compute the observations for
each country.
Using an alternative measure of the exchange rate regime The last two regressions
in Table 2 use the exchange rate classi￿cation due to Shambaugh (2004). The results are
much weaker than those based on the Reinhart-Rogo⁄ scheme. In the speci￿cation that does
not control for in￿ ation and its square the expected relationship between openness and the
Phillips curve slope is signi￿cant only amongst countries that maintain greatest exchange rate
￿ exibility. In the more general regression both coe¢ cients on terms in openness are insigni￿cant
15at conventional levels, though they are both of the expected sign. One explanation for these
￿ndings is that the binary classi￿cation entails a loss of information compared to the multi-tier
Reinhart-Rogo⁄ scheme. Also, given that the alternative index does not include information
from parallel currency markets it may be considered a less comprehensive guide to the history
of the exchange rate regime.
Figure 1 - see end of document.
Table 2 - see end of document.
Controlling for reverse causation Next we investigate the possibility that the results are
due to reverse causation. Consider a country that faces a steep Phillips curves for reasons
unrelated to openness and the exchange rate regime. Demand shocks will induce relatively
volatile in￿ ation and a relatively volatile exchange rate in such a country, causing it to be placed
towards the ￿ exible end of the Reinhart-Rogo⁄ classi￿cation. This could lead to a spurious
relationship between openness, the exchange rate regime and the slope of the Phillips curve.
Two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation can be used to address this issue.
In column 1 of Table 3 EX is treated as endogenous and OPEN is treated as exogenous. The
￿rst stage regression for OPEN￿EX uses as instruments the levels and squares of the exogenous
term, OPEN, and land area in square miles (data for the latter are taken from Romer (1993)).
The outside instrument is used on the grounds that small countries may be more dependent
on trade with the rest of the world and may therefore be inclined to select a ￿xed exchange
rate regime. A Hansen J-test indicates that the null hypothesis of instrument validity cannot be
rejected at the 10% level (this test is based on the sample analogue of the over-identifying moment
conditions that underpin the 2SLS estimator and is robust to heteroscedasticity in the residuals).
It is also important to note that the F-statistic for the ￿rst stage regression is 11:18 and signi￿cant
at the 0:1% level, con￿rming that the instruments have adequate explanatory power for the
endogenous regressor (Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) suggest that an F-statistic greater than
10 is su¢ cient to ensure that weak instrument biases are avoided). As in the case of the
OLS estimates the t ￿ ratios calculated from the second stage regression use heteroscedasticity
16consistent standard errors.15
The coe¢ cient estimates for OPEN and OPEN￿EX are negative and larger in absolute size
than those obtained by OLS (see Table 1, column 6), though due to the additional estimation
uncertainty neither term is individually signi￿cant at the 5% level. This outcome changes in
column 2, however, in which the level and square of in￿ ation are used as regressors and are
treated as potentially endogenous. The level and square of per capita income in 1980 US$ are
added to the instrument set in order to handle the additional endogenous regressors (data are
from Romer (1993)). The slope coe¢ cients for the openness term and its interaction with the
exchange rate regime are each signi￿cant at the 5% level, as are those for the terms in in￿ ation.
All of the coe¢ cients change somewhat relative to the OLS case, however, see column 8 in Table
1. Overall, the results from 2SLS estimation indicate that the relationship between openness,
the exchange rate regime and the Phillips curve is unlikely the result of reverse causation bias.
Table 3 - see end of document.
5 Evidence from sacri￿ce ratios
This section uses sacri￿ce ratios to measure the slope of the Phillips curve, as in Temple (2002).
This is de￿ned by Ball (1994) as the ratio between total output losses and the change in trend
in￿ ation over the course of a disin￿ ation (a disin￿ ation is a period during which trend in￿ ation
falls by more than 1:5 percentage points from peak to trough). Total output losses are calculated
as the sum of annual deviations of real GDP from a straight line connecting output in the year
of an in￿ ation peak to output in the year after an in￿ ation trough. Trend in￿ ation in year t
is an average of the annual rate of consumer price in￿ ation recorded in eight quarters, namely
the four quarters of year t, the last two quarters of t ￿ 1 and the ￿rst two quarters of t + 1.
Ball calculates sacri￿ce ratios for 65 disin￿ ation episodes in 19 OECD countries observed for
1961 ￿ 91.
A small sacri￿ce ratio corresponds to a steep Phillips curve and so again we expect negative
15All of the 2SLS estimates are obtained using the ivreg2 package in STATA 9.0. This package also allows for
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation, and we found that this method delivered very similar results
to those reported in Table 3.
17coe¢ cients for openness and its interaction with the exchange rate regime. In column 1 of
Table 4 the dependent variable is the set of sacri￿ce ratios reported by Ball and the explanatory
variables are as follows:
￿ OPEN is the measure of openness used by Temple (2002), i.e. an average for 1973 ￿ 88.
￿ EX is the average of the Reinhart-Rogo⁄ index over the course of the disin￿ ation.
￿ LENGTH is the disin￿ ation length in years.
￿ INFLOSS is the reduction in in￿ ation during the disin￿ ation.
￿ PEAK is the in￿ ation rate in the year in which the disin￿ ation started.
The last three controls are used by Ball (1994) and Temple (2002).16 As in Temple (2002) the
results indicate little support for the hypothesis that openness increases the Phillips curves slope.
One reason for this may be that many of the sacri￿ce ratios correspond to disin￿ ations from the
1960s and 1970s and are drawn entirely from OECD countries. In order to investigate this idea
we calculated sacri￿ce ratios for disin￿ ations occurring during the post-1980 period in the sample
of countries considered in section 4 (disin￿ ations starting before 1980 but which lie mainly in the
post-1980 period are included in the sample). In a few cases disin￿ ations started from extremely
high in￿ ation rates of more than 100%, mainly in Latin American countries during the 1980s.
These episodes were excluded from the analysis leaving a sample of 71 sacri￿ce ratios drawn
from 38 countries (this is a subset of the 41 country sample used in section 4 because some
countries did not implement any disin￿ ations). The data are tabulated in the appendix.17 It
should be noted that less than 30% of the sacri￿ce ratios that we calculate are for disin￿ ations
spanning the negative shock to oil prices in 1986. This is important because it suggests that
the new information that we collect regarding the slope of the Phillips curve mainly relates to
the dynamics of output and in￿ ation following a demand contraction rather than the e⁄ects of
a supply shock.
The disin￿ ations that we identify for the 19 countries considered by Ball do not always
16A measure of the duration of wage contracts is also used by these authors. We do not consider this variable
because it is not available for the larger sample of countries included in regressions 2￿6. In any case, the variable
is not signi￿cant at the 5% level in the regressions reported by Temple.
17In the case of Germany we use Ball￿ s measure of the sacri￿ce ratio for 1980￿86 due to problems in obtaining
consistent data for in￿ ation spanning German uni￿cation in 1991.
18match those reported by Ball. For Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK,
Ball identi￿es two disin￿ ations during the early 1980s, whereas we identify just one. This is due
to data revisions that have smoothed out some turning points. The correlation between the two
sets of sacri￿ce ratios calculated for the other 14 countries studied by Ball is 87:5%, indicating
agreement over the pattern of international di⁄erences in the slope of the Phillips curve in most
cases.18
Columns 2￿6 report regressions for the new sample of sacri￿ce ratios (explanatory variables
are measured over periods covered by the corresponding disin￿ ations). In column 2 there is
some evidence that openness increases the slope of the Phillips curve even though the exchange
rate regime interaction is excluded. The relationship is not signi￿cant at the 5% level, however.
In column 3 the interaction between openness and the exchange rate regime is added and both
terms are signi￿cant at the 5% level.19 If this speci￿cation is re-estimated using only the 19
countries considered by Ball and Temple (giving a sample of 38 observations) the coe¢ cient for
openness is ￿6:57 (t = ￿1:94) and that for the interaction is ￿2:80 (t = ￿1:63) indicating that
the magnitude of the relationship between openness and the sacri￿ce ratio does not depend on
including non-OECD countries in the sample. Instead, it appears that the relationship between
openness, the Phillips curve slope and the exchange rate regime depends on using data from
the post-1980 period. This is consistent with the ￿ndings of the previous section, in which the
output-in￿ ation trade-o⁄ was used to measure the slope of the Phillips curve.
It is interesting to note that the coe¢ cient on the interaction term in column 2 is approxi-
mately one third the size of that on openness, whereas in the output-in￿ ation trade-o⁄regressions
the two e⁄ects were of similar magnitude. Further, in regressions 4￿6 in Table 4 the interaction
term becomes insigni￿cant, most likely because the length and scale of a disin￿ ation are channels
through which openness and exchange rate adjustment in￿ uence the slope of the Phillips curve.
A possible reason for the exchange rate regime being less important in inducing a correlation
18Bernanke et al. (1999) and Boschen and Weise (2001) compute sacri￿ce ratios using more recent vintages
of data than Ball (1994) and also note small di⁄erences in the exact dates for disin￿ ation episodes and the
magnitudes of the sacri￿ce ratios when compared to those in Ball (1994).
19The coe¢ cient for openness increases substantially when using sacri￿ce ratios from the post-1980 period.
This re￿ ects the fact that sacri￿ce ratios have generally been larger during that period due to disin￿ ations having
been smaller in magnitude during the last quarter of a century.
19between openness and the sacri￿ce ratio than in inducing a correlation between openness and
the output-in￿ ation trade-o⁄ is that the former measures the relationship between output and
in￿ ation over a longer horizon than does the latter. For example, the mean duration of the
71 disin￿ ation episodes is 4:2 years, whereas the output-in￿ ation trade-o⁄ focuses on a 1 year
horizon. Over the medium-term a correlation between openness and the Phillips curve slope
may be more likely, e.g. because the pass-through from exchange rate movements to import and
consumer prices increases with time. As a result, when the Phillips curve is measured over a four
year horizon it is related to openness even amongst countries that allow only an intermediate
degree of exchange rate ￿ exibility because even medium sized exchange rate movements lead to
some price adjustment. In contrast, when the Phillips curve is measured over a one year horizon
it is only relatively large exchange rate movements that induce in￿ ation adjustment, such that
openness exerts a statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect only amongst those countries that allow greatest
exchange rate ￿ exibility.20
Table 4 -see end of document.
Checking for outliers In order to check for outlying observations we plotted the conditional
relationships between the sacri￿ce ratio, openness and the interaction between openness and the
exchange rate regime. The scatter graphs (not reported here) revealed the following outlying
observations:
￿ Finland, 1989 ￿ 96. This episode includes the Russian crisis of the early 1990s, which
caused Finnish GDP to collapse. Consequently the sacri￿ce ratio is almost 10 times the sample
average.
￿ Panama, 1980￿86. Panama has the highest level of openness in the sample and therefore
appears as an outlier.
In Table 5 we summarise the results obtained for regressions that include dummy variables
for these observations. The relationship between openness, the exchange rate regime and the
20An alternative explanation for the sacri￿ce ratio being more closely related to openness is that (unlike BMR￿ s
output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄) it derives from an in￿ ation measure based on consumer prices rather than the GDP
de￿ ator. Consumer prices include import prices directly and as a result their dynamics are more likely to be
closely related to the openness of the economy.
20slope of the Phillips curve is preserved, though note that the coe¢ cients for openness and the
interaction term are slightly smaller than those reported previously.
Table 5 - see end of document.
Controlling for reverse causation bias In column 1 of Table 6 we treat OPEN ￿ EX as
endogenous and estimate a 2SLS regression in which the additional instruments are the levels and
squares of land area and income in 1980. The relationship between openness, the exchange rate
regime and the slope of the Phillips curve is robust, though as in section 4 the point estimates are
larger than those obtained by OLS. The Hansen test associated with this regression yields a p-
value of 49% and the ￿rst stage regression an F-statistic of 11:47, indicating that the instruments
are valid and explain a non-trivial proportion of the variation in the endogenous variable. The
picture is essentially the same in column 2, in which the square of openness is added to the
instrument set to provide a comparison with the instrument set used to obtain the results in
Table 3. Overall, the evidence from sacri￿ce ratios appears more robust to 2SLS estimation
than that from output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄s.21
Table 6 ￿see end of document.
The role of central bank independence The ￿nal issue that we address is whether or not
the results are robust to controlling for measures of central bank independence, CBI. Daniels
et al. (2004) show that when CBI and its interaction with openness are added to the sacri￿ce
ratio regressions in Temple (2002), the slope of the Phillips curve is found to be a decreasing
function of openness, the opposite result to that predicted in Romer (1993). This ￿nding is based
on the Ball (1994) estimates of the sacri￿ce ratio. In Table 7 we ask whether or not a similar
result holds for the sacri￿ce ratios that we have calculated. The CBI variable is measured using
Cukierman￿ s (1992) index of the legal independence of central banks. This is just one of the
indices considered in Daniels et al. (2004), though similar results are obtained for each measure
21We do not consider regressions that add further controls because the instruments available for terms such as
LENGTH are very weak, leading to results in which all regressors are insigni￿cant at the 5% level (although of
the same sign as those reported in our main results).
21of CBI. As the index is available for only a subset of the 38 countries included in Table 4 the
sample size falls from 71 to 53.
Regressions 1￿5 in Table 7 add CBI and OPEN ￿CBI to the main speci￿cations in Table
4. These variables are not signi￿cant at any stage. In each case the coe¢ cients on openness and
the exchange rate interaction term are negative, though they are less signi￿cant than before.22
Similar results obtain when the sample is further restricted through considering disin￿ ations
occurring only in the 19 countries considered by Ball, but these are not reported here.
One interpretation of these ￿ndings and those in Daniels et al. (2004) is the following. For
much of the period considered by Ball (1994) the mechanisms that might cause the slope of the
Phillips curve to increase with openness did not operate because government control of pricing
decisions and macroeconomic management based largely on ￿scal policy prevented the necessary
exchange rate and price adjustment. Consequently factors causing the Phillips curve slope to
respond negatively to openness dominated, hence the Daniels et al. ￿ndings. In contrast, for
the sample that we consider monetary policy has been more important in driving economic
￿ uctuations and this has lead to the exchange rate and price adjustment that causes the Phillips
curve slope to increase with openness, hence the ￿ndings in this paper. Thus, we do not interpret
our results as being at odds with those in Daniels et al., but rather as a sign that the mechanisms
underpinning the Phillips curve relationship have changed through time.
Table 7 - see end of document.
6 Summary
This paper has examined the hypothesis that the slope of the Phillips curve is positively related
to trade openness. Such a relationship arises in standard open economy models incorporating
short-run price stickiness. The paper focuses on two extensions of existing empirical research
on this topic. Firstly, the strength of the relationship is allowed to depend on the exchange
rate regime. Secondly, the Phillips curve slope is measured using data from only the 1980s
and 1990s. Evidence from both output-in￿ ation trade-o⁄s and sacri￿ce ratios indicates that
22The sample mean for CBI is 0:36, so even though the OPEN ￿CBI term is positively signed, the derivative
of the sacri￿ce ratio with respect to openness remains negative for almost all countries.
22amongst countries maintaining ￿ exible exchange rate regimes the e⁄ect of openness has been
to increase the Phillips curve slope, though this relationship has only been evident during the
post-1980 period. One explanation for this ￿nding is that during the past quarter of a century
macroeconomic management has relied less heavily on ￿scal policy and price controls, both of
which are likely to undermine a relationship between openness and the Phillips curve slope. In
extensions of the basic econometric approach the results showed some fragility, but the overall
picture indicates stronger support for the underlying theory than has previous research in this
area, and it seems that a positive e⁄ect of openness on the slope of the Phillips curve cannot be
ruled out.
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23Appendix
This appendix lists output-in￿ ation trade-o⁄s and sacri￿ce ratios for the post-1980 period.
South Africa and Zaire are excluded from the sample used by Temple (2002) because the ex-
change rate regime indicator is missing for these countries in some or all years, but New Zealand
is added, giving 41 countries in total. This is the sample used in all regressions in Tables 1-3,
except those in columns 3 and 4 in Table 1. Brazil, Nicaragua and Peru drop out of the sample in
these cases due to gaps in the data used to estimate the slope of the Phillips curve for 1973￿86.
In column 1 in Table 1 the observation for New Zealand is taken from Froyen and Waud (1995),
who follow the same methodology as BMR. The samples used in Tables 4-7 are described in the
text.
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27Figure 1: Conditional effects on the slope of the Phillips curve 
 


























Notes: Rows 1, 2 and 3 correspond to partial regression lines from columns 6, 8 and 10 respectively in 
Table 1. See the text for further details. Table 1
Openness and the output-inflation trade-off
Regression 12345
Observation period 1948-86 1948-86 1973-86 1973-86 1981-98
Constant 0.56 (4.81) 0.57 (4.25) 0.34 (2.50) 0.37 (2.68) 0.25 (1.99)
OPEN 0.08 (0.36) 0.08 (0.39) -0.15 (0.43) -0.28 (0.81) 0.20 (0.59)
OPEN*EX 0.03 (0.22) -0.22 (2.13)
INF -5.56 (3.19) -5.65 (3.17)
SQINF 8.37 (2.76) 8.59 (2.72)
VOL 1.01 (0.39) 0.97 (0.36)
SQVOL -2.22 (0.36) -2.28 (0.37)
0.4 0.4 0.003 0.04 0.01
Sample size 41 41 38 38 41
Regression 6789 1 0
Observation period 1981-98 1981-98 1981-98 1981-98 1981-98
Constant 0.45 (3.27) 0.64 (4.73) 0.68 (5.39) 0.74 (5.76) 0.72 (5.44)
OPEN -0.60 (1.59) -0.87 (2.53) -0.55 (1.58) -0.57 (1.62) -0.51 (1.43)
OPEN*EX -0.55 (4.18) -0.53 (3.77) -0.34 (2.00) -0.31 (1.65) -0.29 (1.61)
INF -0.52 (2.91) -1.76 (4.59) -2.97 (4.26) -2.71 (2.84)
SQINF 0.87 (4.02) 1.14 (4.38) 0.98 (2.22)
VOL 0.81 (2.82) 0.39 (0.44)
SQVOL 0.30 (0.58)
0.17 0.36 0.51 0.56 0.57





Observation period is the interval over which variables are measured for most countries, see the appendix for
full details. Absolute heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses.Table 2
Robustness checks for openness and the output-inflation trade-off
Robustness check Control for inflation and its square? OPEN OPEN*EX
Exclude Israel NO -0.64 (1.40) -0.58 (3.28)
Exclude Israel YES -0.82 (2.36) -0.46 (2.81)
Exclude Argentina, NO -0.89 (2.36) -0.61 (4.53)
Bolivia and Brazil
Exclude Argentina, YES -0.41 (1.49) -0.26 (1.57)
Bolivia and Brazil
Measure PC using NO -1.12 (2.30) -0.63 (3.41)
single EX regime
Measure PC using YES -1.28 (2.51) -0.56 (2.57)
single EX regime
Use Shambaugh NO -0.13 (0.39) -0.75 (2.57)
exchange rate indicators
Use Shambaugh YES -0.19 (0.80) -0.30 (1.03)
exchange rate indicators
Coefficient estimates (absolute heteroscedasticity consistent t-ratios) for versions of regression 6 in Table 1
modified according to the notes in the first column.Table 3
Regressions for the output-inflation trade-off estimated by 2SLS
Regression 1 2
Constant 0.57 (2.04) 1.00 (4.43)
OPEN -1.04 (1.09) -1.68 (2.07)
OPEN*EX -0.85 (1.65) -1.06 (2.45)
INF -1.95 (3.64)
square of INF 0.91 (2.28)
Additional instruments square of OPEN square of OPEN
LAND LAND
square of LAND square of LAND
INCOME
square of INCOME
Hansen J-statistic 4.13 (0.13) 4.38 (0.11)
(p-value in parentheses)
Sample size 41 41
Variables measured over 1981-98. OPEN treated as exogenous and is included in
the instrument set. All other variables are treated as endogenous. Standard errors
are adjusted for 2SLS estimation and heteroscedasticity at the second stage. The
Hansen J-statistic is computed based on the null hypothesis of instrument validity.Table 4
Openness and the sacrifice ratio
Regression 1 2 3
Constant 0.11 (0.23) 1.87 (3.75) 2.56 (3.98)
OPEN -0.55 (0.42) -2.65 (1.87) -5.31 (2.89)





Sample size 65 71 71
No. of countries 19 38 38
Observation period 1961-91 1981-98 1981-98
Regression 4 5 6
Constant 0.38 (0.74) 0.51 (1.02) 0.58 (1.07)
OPEN -4.31 (2.86) -3.18 (2.05) -3.19 (2.04)
OPEN*EX -0.88 (1.75) -0.07 (0.12) -0.05 (0.07)
LENGTH 0.46 (4.48) 0.46 (4.61) 0.45 (4.32)
INFLOSS -0.04 (2.20) -0.03 (1.36)
PEAK -0.004 (0.42)
0.34 0.37 0.37
Sample size 71 71 71
No. of countries 38 38 38





Sacrifice ratios used in column 1 are from Ball (1994), those in columns 2-6 are based on our
calculations and are tabulated in the appendix. Regressors are measured for the period of the
disinflation, except OPEN in column 1, which is the measure of openness from Romer (1993).
Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-consistent t-ratios.Table 5
Robustness checks for openness and the sacrifice ratio
Dummy included for Control for LENGTH, INFLOSS, PEAK? OPEN OPEN*EX
Finland, 1989-96 NO -4.47 (2.76) -1.31 (2.15)
Finland, 1989-96 YES -2.67 (1.85) 0.09 (0.14)
Panama, 1980-86 NO -4.46 (2.55) -1.87 (2.71)
Panama, 1980-86 YES -2.45 (1.61) -0.43 (0.72)
Coefficient estimates (absolute heteroscedasticity-consistent t-ratios in parentheses) for regressions of the sacrifice
ratio on OPEN and OPEN*EX. Dummy variables included for observations noted in first column, additional controls
noted in second column.Table 6
Regressions for the sacrifice ratio estimated by 2SLS
Regression 1 2
Constant 5.29 (3.54) 3.63 (4.54)
OPEN -15.74 (2.84) -9.38 (3.54)
OPEN*EX -8.14 (2.74) -4.19 (2.69)
Additional instruments LAND LAND
square of LAND square of LAND
INCOME INCOME
square of INCOME square of INCOME
square of OPEN
Hansen J-statistic 2.43 (0.49) 7.09 (0.13)
(p-value in parentheses)
Sample size 71 71
OPEN is treated as exogenous and is included in the instruemnt set. EX is treated as
endogenous. Standard errors are adjusted for 2SLS estimation and heteroscedasticity at
the second stage. The Hansen J-statistic is computed based on the null hypothesis of
instrument validity.Table 7
Regressions for the sacrifice ratio with CBI controls
Regression 12345
Constant 3.61 (2.45) 4.38 (2.54) 0.92 (0.68) 0.94 (0.69) 1.01 (0.73)
OPEN -5.98 (1.56) -9.23 (1.91) -7.66 (1.75) -6.24 (1.48) -6.27 (1.47)
OPEN*EX -1.80 (1.71) -1.37 (1.66) -0.65 (0.67) -0.65 (0.67)
LENGTH 0.49 (4.26) 0.49 (4.38) 0.48 (4.07)
INFLOSS -0.03 (1.45) -0.03 (0.68)
PEAK -0.01 (0.47)
CBI -4.28 (1.09) -4.48 (1.08) -1.30 (0.36) -1.05 (0.30) -1.01 (0.28)
OPEN*CBI 10.56 (0.89) 11.85 (0.97) 7.21 (0.62) 5.95 (0.53) 5.76 (0.50)
0.06 0.1 0.32 0.34 0.34
Sample size 53 53 53 53 53
The CBI variable is the Cukierman (1992) index of the legal independence of central banks (LVAU).
Absolute heteroscedasticity-consistent t-ratios in parentheses.
R
2Table A1
Measures of the output-inflation tradeoff and the sacrifice ratio
Country Output-inflation Sacrifice ratio
trade-off Disinflation 1 Disinflation 2 Disinflation 3 Disinflation 4
Argentina -0.041
Australia 0.613 1.092 (82-84) 0.013 (86-88) 1.651 (89-93)
Austria 0.753 -0.695 (81-83) 0.344 (84-87) 3.521 (92-98)
Belgium 0.588 1.48 (82-87) 0.636 (90-95)
Bolivia -0.006 0.478 (91-94)
Brazil -0.003
Canada 0.764 1.601 (81-85) 3.223 (90-94)
Colombia 0.157
Costa Rica -0.113 0.006 (82-85) -0.294 (91-93)
Denmark 0.555 1.287 (80-86) 3.927 (88-93)
Dominican Rep -0.163 0.334 (80-82) -0.082 (85-87) 0.066 (90-93) 0.059 (95-97)
Ecuador 0.067 -0.074 (83-85) 0.027 (89-91) -0.035 (92-95)
El Salvador 0.101 2.232 (80-82) -0.145 (86-88) 0.297 (90-91)
Finland 0.687 0.812 (81-87) 10.529 (89-96)
France 0.362 0.926 (81-87) 1.309 (90-94)
Germany 0.629 2.132 (80-86)
Greece 0.109 1.536 (80-84) 0.568 (86-88)
Guatemala -0.015 -0.375 (80-82) 0.019 (86-88) -0.06 (90-95)
Iceland 0.074 0.818 (88-95)
Iran 0.31 -0.328 (95-98)
Ireland 0.537 1.454 (81-88) -1.851 (89-93)
Israel -0.007 -0.056 (89-93)
Italy 0.029 1.352 (80-87) 2.125 (90-94) 0.245 (95-98)
Jamaica 0.051 0.027 (85-87)
Japan 0.917 2.916 (80-87) 0.783 (90-95)
Mexico -0.124 -0.246 (83-85)
Netherlands 0.586 1.443 (81-87) 3.922 (91-96)
New Zealand 0.297 -0.191 (80-84) -0.653 (86-92)
Nicaragua 0.019
Norway 0.255 1.164 (81-85) 4.122 (87-94)
Panama 0.754 -2.323 (80-86)
Peru 0.029
Phillipines -0.143 -0.165 (80-82) 0.376 (84-86) 1.038 (91-94)
Portugal 0.114 0.108 (84-87)
Spain 0.436 3.697 (77-88) 6.06 (90-98)
Sweden 0.431 1.726 (80-87) 0.569 (90-98)
Switzerland 0.922 0.492 (82-87) 2.716 (91-98)
Tunisia 0.551 -1.497 (91-93)
UK 1.039 2.363 (80-87) 1.54 (90-93)
US 0.771 1.303 (80-86) 2.485 (90-94)
Venezuela -0.09 -0.414 (80-83) -0.38 (89-92)
Output-inflation trade-offs estimated for 41 countries for 1981-98, except Argentina (1982-98), Brazil (1989-98), Nicaragua
(1991-98), Peru (1991-98) and Portugal (1991-98). Sacrifice ratios are for the post-1980 period. Disinflations starting before
1980 but lying mainly in the post-1980 period are included in the sample. Numbers in parentheses are the years during which
the disinflation occurred. Underlying data from International Financial Statistics .